The post-Brexit shambles in the United Kingdom is even worse than the most pessimistic pundit might have predicted. Shock among members of the Remain camp has given way to anger, if not rage. The blatant opportunism, if not arrogant selfishness, of some of the politicians in the Leave campaign, is now apparent. An article by Jonathan Friedland available on the website of The Guardian displays not only controlled rage but the deepest contempt for the likes of Boris Johnson and Michael Gove, happy, he argues, to gamble the future of their country - which they profess to love so much - in order to further themselves and increase their status. It is one thing for the uninformed person in the street to express satisfaction that "we have taken our island back", but neither Johnson nor Gove fall into this category. They knew better. As Friedland writes, it simply beggars belief that Gove et al. could express satisfaction in regaining the sovereignty of the United Kingdom if the future of the country is imperilled: there can be no doubt that when Scotland's First Minister says her country (which voted convincingly to Remain) will not leave the European Union, she means precisely what she says.

It seems more than ironic that, in the days following the Brexit result, the presidents of the United States and Mexico, in company with the Prime Minister of Canada, were preaching the gospel of cooperation and inter-dependendency, in sharp contrast to the Leave message that "we can go it alone", or at any rate, strike a deal with the EU that preserves Britain's trading relationship without having to assume the responsibilities of full membership. This is to some extent an illusion. In order to import goods into the Union, manufacturers are required to abide by the standards it sets as regards quality and the like. They do not have a free hand in such matters, despite what their domestic legislation may say. Taken to its logical end, this may have a slightly odd result whereby non-member states or their citizens are required to assume certain obligations but have no say in setting the standards: obligations but no rights.

Events since the decision was announced have moved with such rapidity that it seemed rash to try to write something sensible about what has been going on. The pace of events may be slackening, but battle lines have been established. It is surely more than surprising that David Cameron and members of his government calmly announced that discussions with the EU will have to await the decision on a new leader for the Conservative Party (due probably in October). It is as if the opinions of the 27 other members of the Union didn't matter. The larger countries, however, have made it clear that The EU will set the agenda, not the [apparently] departing British. And why should they not? They did not cause this crisis. They want matters resolved quickly, and again, why should they not?

What I intend to present here is a sort of stock-taking: where are we at, and where are we going? Indeed, where have we been? One way of doing this is to pose a number of questions, questions designed to probe the forces, real and imaginary, that have brought the United Kingdom to this pass.

Why did the referendum take place at all?

The answer to this is simple. Cameron was faced with apparently deep divisions within his party, not to mention the challenge from the United Kingdom Independence Party [UKIP]. Something not unlike this has happened before. In 1975, the Conservative government of Edward Heath, a staunch European and the man who brought the United Kingdom into what was then simply known as the Common Market, was defeated in a general election fought on grounds which had nothing to do with Europe. The Labour government of Harold Wilson was returned to power, and while the Prime Minister was a supporter of the European project, some prominent members of his government and party were not. Wilson's solution was to hold a referendum on continued membership in an organization which was very much less ambitious than the present EU. Like Cameron, he made some pretence of "renegotiating" some aspects of the deal agreed to by Heath. The country voted overwhelmingly in favour of continued membership.

Although some in Britain remained ambivalent about Europe, to put it no more strongly than that, matters became serious with the accession to power of Margaret Thatcher. In her, they had someone in 10 Downing Street who was openly quasi-hostile or at least combative towards Brussels: It has to be said that her fellow heads of government seemed willing to accommodate her as best they could. There were of course limits to this - a treaty is a legally binding document conferring rights and demanding obligations, and its terms cannot be varied by friendly chat over dinner.

The point is, I think, is that Mrs. Thatcher made it respectable to be anti-European to some degree or other, ranging from the somewhat to the extreme. UKIP is the direct result of the latter. Having said this, we should remember that there are Eurosceptics in many member states, some of whom have been elected to the European Parliament in Strasburg.

I referred in the introduction to this essay to the charge brought by Jonathan Friedland and others that the Brexit fiasco had its roots in the ambitions of certain politicians to advance their careers and status. While there is nothing wrong with this as such, to do so at the expense of the manifest best interests of your country is utterly reprehensible. One can take some comfort from the fact that Boris Johnson has perhaps reaped what he sowed.

Was the Referendum necessary?

Clearly not. David Cameron, an overt supporter of Europe, won the last British general election by a convincing majority. It seems to me he could have taken comfort and more from that fact. It would surely have been an option to say to dissenters in his own party, "Here I am, come at me if you want". This would in all likelihood have led to at least one challenge to his leadership, but there is nothing new in that. Would this not have been a more principled approach, one founded on parliamentary democracy as the UK has understood it for more than one hundred years?

I believe it is also possible to argue that the whole approach to the Referendum, if the Referendum was going to be, was very ill-advised. The notion that the future of the United Kingdom could be decided on the basis of 50% plus one was surely incredible. There was a plebiscite in Scotland in the late 1970s on establishing an assembly with some powers devolved from Westminster. The majority of voters were in favour, but the majority did not reach the required threshold of 60%. Why was there no threshold in a referendum dealing with matters of rather greater importance?

There can be only one answer. The Remain side thought it was bound to win. This was only one of the many miscalculations the British government made. There were others: with all due respect to the individuals concerned, it is surely something of a waste of time to warn citizens in shopping malls in the North of England of the likely consequences to the stock exchange and the City of a decision to quit the EU. Why would they care? Indeed, this sort of rhetoric would only serve to underline the gulf between "the establishment" and "ordinary people".