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Re-evaluating
Aristotle's Problems Aristotle's
Problems (or as it is called in Greek Problemata) used to
be considered a central text in the study of Aristotle; now, it has
been downgraded to "pseudo Aristotelian". A standard modern
edition of Problemata begins with the following disclaimer or
caveat.
I
disagree with this downgrading of Problemata. I agree with
the old view. Problemata
is vastly under-rated. This is because it has "come down to
us" as a book of questions and answers, and most of the book is the
answers, which are not by Aristotle. The answers are the work
of a student. The questions, however, the problemata
themselves, were undoubtedly written by Aristotle; they are brilliant
and could not have been written by anyone else.2 What
we have in Problemata is a student's filled-in copy of Aristotle's
book of questions. The answers are an attempt to be "Aristotelian."
They are turgid. The questions are amazing. There are hundreds
of them. Why do great excesses make people
sick? And why are great excesses cures of illness? Why do camels yawn in sympathy when
other camels yawn? Why do young men, when they first
have sex, feel disgust for their partners? Why is sweat salty? Why does everything seem to go in
circles to those who are very drunk? Why is it more tiring for the arm
to throw empty-handed than to throw a rock? Why does sex feel good? Is that the way it has to be for animals or is there some other reason for it?
Why does sitting down make some
men fat and other men thin? Some
of these questions have no answer and could have no answer. Others
have obvious answers. Some could be answered by science, others
could not and one, at least, is based on a "fact" that many people
would question. The answers to the questions and the factualness
of the facts behind the questions are beside the point. The point
of these questions is the questions themselves. They are amazingly
provocative of thought and more than that, they may actually give us
some idea of what went on at the Lyceum, Aristotle's school in Athens.
Problemata also suggests a way to read Aristotle that makes him
more accessible. Instead of being read for his "philosophy",
Aristotle can be read simply for the brilliance of his observations. Aristotle's quote/unquote
philosophy Because
he is a philosopher, people assume Aristotle must have a "philosophy"
and they read him to learn it. This "philosophy" has been
extremely influential in Western culture; by all accounts, it is complicated,
technical and very, very hard to learn. Reading Aristotle's
works for his "philosophy" makes them daunting and relatively inaccessible,
especially in comparison with the writings of Plato. This is because
Plato wrote for publication and Aristotle did not. Because
Plato used metaphor and drama, it is hard to say exactly what his philosophy
is, but his dialogues are not hard to read in either Greek or English.
By contrast, Aristotle is almost impossible to read in either language.
His works are always translated into smooth, sophisticated, elaborate
English sentences, but Aristotle did not write in smooth, sophisticated,
elaborate Greek. Aristotle's Greek is a private, cryptic shorthand
that even the best scholars find puzzling. For centuries, it was
said that Aristotle wrote as he did precisely to conceal his meaning. Aristotle's
father was a doctor. He trained Aristotle as a boy to keep notes
of what he was working on. This was what doctors did back then;
they kept private notes. Aristotle retained the habit of keeping
private notes through the whole of his life. Between the ages
17-37, when he was with Plato at the Academy, Aristotle wrote for an
audience and published his work. Except for fragments, we do not
have any of that work.3 What we call "The Works of
Aristotle," are the unpublished notes Aristotle kept toward the end
of his life. These notes do not contain any of the complicated
technical terms found in modern logic, mathematics or science and they
do not use the elaborate philosophical terminology that has been developed
in the years since Aristotle wrote. They are much less sophisticated
than the translations make them out to be. Translation
changes Aristotle far more than it does Plato and even in translation,
Aristotle is harder to understand than Plato. There are parts
of Aristotle's work that no one feels they understand. His Greek
words are translated to make the best sense anyone can of them, but
no one feels secure in what he says. Of
all Aristotle's works Problemata
suffers least in translation. The English translation says exactly
what the Greek says. This is because Aristotle wrote the problemata
in straight-forward Greek, as simple questions. Almost all begin
dio ti, why? If
Problemata is taken seriously, Aristotle's works become easier
to read. Problemata is not coherent or consistent and it
has no "philosophy". It is simply a collection of brilliant
observations turned into questions. It suggests a different way
to read Aristotle. Aristotle
can be read not as a philosopher having a "philosophy", but
as a philosopher doing philosophy. If Aristotle is read
this way, what stands out about his works is that he says so many brilliant
things that no one else would ever say. For instance. If people spend
money to gain office, they are likely to think of the office as something
they purchased and expect to make a profit on it.4 This is something everyone
thinks, but only Aristotle says it; and he says it so simply. Aristotle
suffers from having too big a name. He is taken far too seriously.
Aristotle does not have to be read as a philosopher at all. He
can be read as if he were a really smart, really inquisitive kid.
In Aristotle's Vision of the Soul, F.J.E. Woodbridge says
"Sometimes", Woodbridge
says "I think he is almost incredibly naive."
Aristotle
looks at whatever there is to see, asks whatever questions come into
his mind and says whatever he thinks. What makes him different
from ordinary men, is his insistence on seeing the most obvious things
and not censoring them. Old people do not
hate or love completely. They love as if they might someday come
to hate and hate as if they might someday come to love.7 Aristotle is not systematic Though
Woodbridge reads Aristotle in a simpler way than most, even he says,
This has never been
my impression of Aristotle. On the contrary, what stands out in
Aristotle's works is that he contradicts himself continually.
In About Translating,9 for example, the center of
his logical works, Aristotle says, "nothing happens by chance".10
A page and a half later he says, "some things do happen by chance."11
Scholars have spent a tremendous amount of time and effort trying to
explain this contradiction and it is not an isolated example.
In this same book, Aristotle says of two statements "there is no possibility
that they can both be true, but sometimes they may be."12 Aristotle
says, "To think about the truth is hard and easy."13
He says, "People must love themselves, but the many (hoi polloi)
should not."14 He says some things people say are orthos
and not orthos, "straight and not straight."15
He says, "It's obvious that by nature some are free and others slaves....
But it isn't hard to see that those who say the opposite speak straight."16
He says: "In a way, on the one hand, somehow everything has been said,
in a way, on the other hand, somehow nothing has been said."17 Saying
contradictory things is so characteristic of Aristotle's work that
if one came on a purportedly Aristotelian text that did not overtly
contradict itself, one would have to doubt its authenticity. As
Cicero remarked, Aristotle
Aristotle
looks at many different things. He sees that each one is part
of a bigger thing and that each thing is made up of smaller things.
Things are opposites. A hammer has a hitting end and a holding
end. Both of these are physical, but a hammer is also metaphysical;
it has a purpose that is not in any particular part of it. Aristotle
see things as unities and he sees them as dualities. There are
opposites and opposite opposites. Some opposites have a middle
between them; some do not. The opposite of "all" is "none",
but "some" is also the opposite of "all" ... and yet, "some"
is the opposite of "none". The opposite of opposites is the
same. In
everything, Aristotle sees 1 and 2 and 3 ... and 3+1. +1 is a
theme in Aristotle's work. There are several places where he
says, "There are three somethings", and then he adds, "Oh yes,
there is also one more." There are 4 causes, he says.
In various ways they are opposites of each other, but there is one more
cause, luck, that is the opposite of the other 4. Aristotle's
famous Four Causes are actually 4+1, and his Ten Categories are actually
1+9. To
say that Aristotle's works are "systematic" is like referring
to the medieval English legal writs as "The Writ System."
The writs were intricate and complicated, but there was no "system"
to them. The same is true for Aristotle's works. They
are intricate and complicated and they are all of a piece, but they
are not systematic. They are the opposite of systematic. Aristotle school Aristotle's
works are sometimes referred to as "treatises". Some scholars
think this is too formal a word and see Aristotle's works as "notes"
from which he gave "lectures",19 but so far as I am aware,
there is no evidence for the claim that Aristotle gave lectures at the
Lyceum. Just as it has been assumed that Aristotle must have a
"philosophy" because he was a philosopher, so it has been assumed
that he must have given lectures because he ran a school. 20 The
method of Aristotle's school was questions not lectures. Apparently
a question was posed, which someone answered. Then, the answerer
was questioned on his answer. This obviously harks back to what
Socrates did, but at Aristotle's school, the process seems to have
been highly formalized. Aristotle describes this method extensively
in Topics and Sophistical Refutations, but we do not know
how it worked. According to Topics, a sort of rule book
and players manual for a game we do not understand, only certain kinds
of questions and answers were allowed. Good bad arguments were
encouraged. Aristotle says practicing good bad arguments with
others helps a philosopher argue with himself.21 We
know almost nothing about what actually happened at the Lyceum, but
Problemata might have been the source of the original questions
that were asked at the school. Perhaps each day began with Aristotle
putting a particular problema
to one student. Perhaps the student was told in advance
that it would be his turn that day. Perhaps he was even told from
what area his problema might come. The first 54 problemata
are all medical.22 The second group of 41 problemata
is about sweat. The third group is about drinking and getting
drunk. The fourth is about sex. We think of the Academy as the
model of a university, but the curriculum at the Lyceum may have been
closer to the concerns of modern university students. Perhaps
these are the concerns young men (and now young women) have everywhere
and always. Problemata
manifests the unsystematic nature of Aristotle's philosophical practice
better than any of his other works. In Problemata, Aristotle's
doing of philosophy is condensed down to its essence.
In Problemata, Aristotle looks at things and writes down his
questions about them. He has no concern for consistency or orderliness.
He follows the tangents of his observations doggedly. When he
comes to the end of one tangent, he jumps to another observation, which
may lead to yet another tangent. Plutarch,
a Greek who wrote in Roman times, says Aristotle's method was called
"peripatetic" either because the Lyceum was in a place where people
had once moved around for exercise or because Aristotle and his students
moved around as they disputed, or both. Perhaps Aristotle's
school was called "peripatetic" because Aristotle and his students
moved from question to question in their studies, going off on nothing
but tangents. In
the course of the many arguments he heard about the many questions he
posed Aristotle heard observations he liked or had ideas of his own
about how to say what could be seen. He wrote them down, or perhaps
he had someone else write them down, maybe a slave, or even several
slaves. Perhaps he would say to one slave, take that down for
the notes on Politics, or put this in the notes on Physics.
Some of Aristotle's works sound as if they were dictated and often
in his works, Aristotle gets on a roll. He sees something, says
something about it, says something about what he has just said, says
something about that and then something about that. Aristotle
jumps around in his works and he must have jumped around in the questions
he asked. What else are we to think? Is it conceivable that
Aristotle looked at ethics on Tuesdays and Thursdays from 10:00 to 11:00,
the parts of animals on Mondays and Wednesdays from 11:00 to 12:00 and
metaphysics on Fridays from 3:30 to 5:00? Is it conceivable that
he did physics for three months, meteorology for the next three and
politics for the three after that? Aristotle must have been peripatetic
in his studies. He must have moved from topic to topic, question
to question. This stand out in his works. He goes where
his observations and what he says about them take him. Aristotle and logos Some
of Aristotle's works seem more organized than others. Perhaps
he went over his notes occasionally and organized them. More likely,
what organization there is was imposed later by others. Scholars
have been studying Aristotle's works for 2000 years. They see
plainly enough that there is one great mind behind them all. This
mind sees the same things coming up in different places. There
are recurrent themes: some things are accidental, others are not; some
things exist forever, others come into being and go out of being; some
things are potential, others are actual; one part rules, another part
is ruled. Above
all, there is the division of things into opposites. Aristotle
says, "Everything is opposites or comes from opposites".23
When he looks at justice, he looks at injustice. More than this,
he looks at all the contradictory things "justice" means.
"The quantity of words is limited," he says. "The number of things
is not limited. Words must mean more than one thing."24 Many
of Aristotle's most important insights are comments about the contradictory
nature of words. If we have to find a message in his works it
is that we understand what is said by ourselves and others, only until
we try to explain it, and then we do not. Aristotle's central
observation about "justice" is the brilliant observation that what
is "just" is what is "equal" (isos), but "equal"
means two opposite things. If Milo the wrestler gets the same
amount of food as everyone else, he gets "equal" and "not equal". There
is an old dispute about whether Aristotle is talking about words or
things. As W. and K. Neale say,
I
think Aristotle is talking about words. He does say some straightforward,
practical things that are not about words, for instance that cities
should slope downward to the east,26 that pregnant women
should have exercise and eat a good diet,27 that infants
should drink milk, not wine.28 But most of the time,
Aristotle is not talking about how things are or how they should be;
he is talking about how we say they are. Logos,
words and the thinking that lies behind them, is central for Aristotle.
As Woodbridge says, Aristotle "takes language seriously ... He sees
in it well nigh the most important event in the world."29
Some French and German scholars read Aristotle as talking about words,
but the tradition in English scholarship is not to read him that way.
Even though he says expressly that he is talking about the contrary
ways the word "cause" is used, most English scholars take what Aristotle
says about cause to be about cause, not the ways the word "cause"
is used. The ways the word "cause" is used do reflect what
we think about cause, but to talk about the ways the word "cause"
is used is not to talk directly about how things are caused. It
is to talk about what we say about it and how we think about it. J.
L. Ackrill has written a fine commentary on Categories
in which he says "the categories classify things, not words,"30
but notice that even Ackrill feels it is necessary to say this.
Even he thinks one can make the mistake of thinking Aristotle is talking
about words. This is because
Whether
Aristotle is talking about things or not, he looks at how we use words.
He has what Woodbridge calls a "consciousness of language".
This is glaringly obvious in some places in his works, for instance,
Book V of Metaphysics, where he examines the meaning of one word
after another: "beginning," "cause," "element," "nature,"
"necessary," "one," "being," "substance," "the same,"
"opposite," "before," "after," "power," "how much,"
"how," "toward what," "completed," "limit," "in virtue
of which," "placement," "habit," "be effected by," "deprivation,"
"to have," "from something," "part," "whole," "race,"
"false," "accident." That
Aristotle is talking about words is also obvious in his concern for
classification and definition and in his logic, which is about how the
words "all," "some" and "not" should be used.
More than that, Aristotle says that what it means to "know" something is to say it in the right way. For instance, we could say the angles of "an isosceles triangle are equal to two right angles," but it doesn't matter whether a triangle is isosceles or not, any more than it matters whether it is made of bronze. The angles of all triangles are equal to two right angles. If we don't say things properly, Aristotle says, we don't know them.33 Knowledge is seeing what is obviously so and explaining why it is so.34 The why of things (the dio ti) is always a matter of words.
Non-English scholars are more aware of Aristotle's concern with logos than English ones. For instance, when U. Eco, looks at what Aristotle says about "being," he sees that:
If
there is any central theme in Aristotle's works, it is, as he says
explicitly in Topics, that all words have meanings that are contrary
to each other.36 This is not obvious in Problemata.
Aristotle's questions seem to be about things rather words, but questions
must be asked in words and answered in words. Philosophy starts
and ends with what we say. More problemata The
questions in Problemata contain no hint of a systematic "philosophy".
They are clearly a jumble. There are questions about everything:
getting tired, lying down and standing up, getting cold, having bruises.
Problemata has physical questions and questions that are not physical,
at least not in the same way. There are questions about the voice.
Why do men hear less when they are yawning? Why does the tongue
tremble when people are afraid? Why are humans the only creature
to stutter? There are questions about smells. Why do we
smell less when it's cold? Why is the armpit the worst smelling
place? There are questions about mathematics. Why do all
people, barbarians and Greeks, count in tens rather than any other number? There
are questions about living things and non-living things. Why are
bubbles hemispheres? Why do things always get round on the edges?
There are questions about the love of learning. Why is it that
some books put you to sleep against your will while some keep you awake
against your will? There are questions about music. Why
do people who are sad and people who are happy like to hear music? Why
do people get more pleasure from hearing a song they know than a song
they don't know? There are questions about plants. Why
are some vegetables eaten cooked and others raw? Why do we water
plants in the morning, at night or in the evening? Why is it that
only onions make your eyes sting? There are questions about bodies
of water. Why don't the waves break37 in deep open
water but in small bodies or shallow ones? There
are questions about hot water. Why if you put your foot in hot
water does it seem less hot if you hold it still and more hot if you
move it? There are questions about air and wind, questions about
fear and courage. Why do scared people tremble most in their voice,
hands, and lower lip? Why when people are afraid do their bowels
let go and they pee? There are questions about self-control. Why
are there only two senses about which people are said to lack self-control,
touch and taste? Why are self-control and good sense especially admired
among the young and the rich, but justice especially among the poor?
Why do people stifle their laughter less among people they know well? There
are questions about the eyes, the ears, the nose, and the mouth.
Why when people get angry do their eyes get especially red, but when
they are ashamed, their ears? Why is it that though both those
who are short-sighted and those who are old suffer from weakness of
vision, the first bring things closer when they want to see them and
the second take them further away? There are questions about wisdom.
Why from the beginning have there been prizes for physical contests,
but none for wisdom? Questions about justice Along
with everything else, Problemata
has questions about justice. Because I am a law professor, these
questions seem particularly important to me. Why, if an injustice
is greater when a greater good is hurt and honour is a thing that is
a greater good, are injustices that have to do with money thought to
be especially unjust? This
question is being asked by the whole world right now under the leadership
in the United States of President Obama. Why is making off
with a deposit worse than making off with a loan? How,
if at all, is an oath different from a contract? Why in some cases
do jurors vote for the relatives rather than for what the will says? Should
legal cases always, never or sometimes be decided on technicalities,
and if only sometimes, when? Why is there more
poverty among good people than bad ones? This
question breaks my heart, as do the three questions that follow it. Why isn't doing
a big injustice about money the same as doing a big injustice about
something else? A person who would say a small thing might not
tell a big secret, a person who would betray one person might not betray
the whole polis, but a person who would steal an obol would steal a
talent. Why is it that human
beings, despite their education are the most unjust animals? Why is wealth to
be found more often among those who are fouled up than among those who
act properly? These
four questions make Aristotle sound quite radical in his politics but
he is not. Aristotle is not systematic. There is no overall
"philosophy" in his work. There are just questions and observations,
some of which are impossible to understand. Why is it considered
more just to help the dead than the living? I
don't know what Aristotle means by this and I am not sure I understand
what he means by the next question either. Why is it that those
who hang around with healthy people do not get healthier and those who
hang around with strong or beautiful people do not get stronger or more
beautiful, but those who hang around with people who are just, sensible,
and good, become more just, more sensible and more good? It
seems to me that when you hang around with healthy people, you do get
healthier and I'm not sure that you become more good when you hang
around with good people, but the point of the questions, as I said,
is not the answers to them or the facts behind them. The point
of the questions is the questions. For instance, Why is it worse
to kill a woman than a man? Is
it worse to kill a woman than a man? We seem to think it is.
We say "women and children first" in a shipwreck, but why? Why do they give
a defendant the position on the right in a trial? This
question is totally different from all the preceding questions.
It could only be about a particular legal system. There
is no theoretical reason for a defendant to stand on the right.
Or is there? Was this the practice in Athens? I don't
think anyone knows. The
next question looks to be the same but is not. It is a question
about the essence of law. Why when the votes
for the defendant and the accuser are the same, does the defendant win? Burden
of proof is the essence of law. Who gets the benefit of the doubt?
Who gets the burden of proof and how onerous is that burden? There
are no other legal questions.38 The
final two questions seem as if they go back to being about a particular
legal system, but it is hard to imagine what legal system they could
be about. Why, if someone
steals something at the baths, the gym or the market is the punishment
death, but if someone steals something from a house, it is twice the
value of what was stolen? Why for theft is
the punishment death, but for aggravated assault, which is a bigger
injustice, is there an evaluation of what must be suffered or paid? Why
indeed? If these were the law in Athens, why were they law?
Why would any legal system make stealing from a bath more serious than
stealing from a home? Why would it make theft more serious than
assault? Laughing at Aristotle I
have taken the questions about justice quite seriously but one of the
most striking things about Problemata
is how funny most of the questions are, and in this way Problemata
is characteristically Aristotelian. Nearly every time I read Aristotle
I wind up laughing at something he says. What he says is often
so simple and so obvious. It is easier to
do anything, no matter what, than to do it correctly.39 The cleaner ones
clothes are the more readily they become stained.40 Some people answer
questions in their sleep. It seems you can be partly awake when
you're fully asleep, just the way you can be partly asleep when you're
fully awake.41 There's nothing
to stop you from thinking you remember something you don't, but when
you do remember something, you can't think you've forgotten it.42 I
have been laughing at Aristotle since the first time I read him, which
seems to have been in 1960 when I was a freshman at Columbia College.
I have no memory of this, but I still have the source books we used
and on p. 288 I find that I underlined this text and put it in a box.
Next to it in the margin
I wrote "Ha! Ha!" Aristotle
also makes me laugh because he says he sees things no one could conceivably
see. Justice is better
than music.44 The number of flavours
roughly equals the number of colours.45 And finally, I laugh
frivolously because I hear things Aristotle says in the voice of Mae
West. There can never
be too many tall, good-looking men.46 Two good men are always better than one.47 *Steve Wexler is a Professor of Law at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada. Steve has published extensively in the areas of poverty law, philosophy of law, and Greek philosophy.
1 W.S. Hett,
(Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1936) p. vii. 2 My
view, that the questions in Problemata
were written by Aristotle, is arrived at by applying to them the standard
test scholars apply to determine whether a purportedly Aristotelian
text is by Aristotle or not. They ask themselves "Is it brilliant?" I
have perforce to refer frequently to the Constitution of Athens (Athenaion
Politeia), a work ascribed in antiquity to Aristotle. Some moderns
are prepared to accept it as a genuine work from that master's pen;
but I align myself firmly alongside those who cannot accept it as a
product of Aristotle's rare genius, and attribute it instead to a
much less gifted pupil. D.
Stockton, The Classical Athenian Democracy (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1990) p.2 3 It is ironic that
all of Aristotle's published works should have disappeared, while
none of Plato's published work was lost. We seem to have
everything that Plato published. 4 Politics,
II, 11, 1273b 1-3. 5
Aristotle's Vision of the Soul (Columbia, 1965) p. 28. Woodbridge
is the scholar whose way of reading Aristotle is most like mine. 6 Ibid. p. 16. 7 Rhetoric,
2.13.4 8 Woodbridge, op. cit. supra.
n. 5. p 106 9
This book, Peri Hermêneias, is usually called On Interpretation
or Dei Interpretatione or Dei Int.
I call it About Translating. Hermêneias comes
from Hermês (the messenger god). In Xenophon's war stories,
when a city is conquered, a hermês translates between the conquerors
and the conquered. I would happily settle for About Communicating
or About Getting the Message Across
as a translation for Peri Hermêneias. 10
About Translating, ix, 18b 16-17. 11
Ibid. at 19a 19-20. 12 Ibid. at 19b
37-38. 13
Metaphysics, II., 993a 30. 14
Ethics, IX. Xii, 1169a 35. 15
On Life, (usually called De Anima) II. iv, 416b 7 and III.
ii, 426 a 17. 16
Politics, I. v-vi, 1255a 1-4. 17
Metaphysics, I.x, 993a 13-15. 18
De Finibus V. iv (Rackham, trans. Harvard, 1931) 19
E.g. J.A.K. Thomson, The Ethics of Aristotle,
(Penguin, 1953) p. 13 and E. Barker The Political Thought of Plato
and Aristotle (Dover, 1959) p. 65. 20
The closest I have seen to a recognition that Aristotle may not have
given lectures is in E. Barker, The Politics of Aristotle, (Oxford,
1946). "[T]he actual lectures may have been more in the nature of
discussion with members of the class." p. xxxv. 21
Sophistical Refutations XVI., 175a 11. 22
One question that comes up everywhere in Aristotle's works is whether
something is meaningful or merely coincidental. That the first
problemata are medical may be meaningful because Aristotle's father
was a physician. Nicomachus must have kept notes of his practice.
Maybe he passed these notes, complete with the notes of his father and
his father before him, onto Aristotle. These could be the basis
for some of the medical questions in Problemata. 23
Metaphysics, IV. ii, 1005a 4. The Greek word could
be translated as "opposites" or "contraries". The contrarity
of language comes up quite often in Metaphysics, e.g. IX. i,
1046 b 5-11 and X. i, 1052b 27.
At Physics, I. v, 188b 25, Aristotle repeats that "everything
that comes in nature is opposites or from opposites" and at I. v,
189a 10, he says "it appears that the beginnings must be contraries". 24
Sophistical Refutations, I., 165a 11-12 25
W. Neale, K. Neale, The Development of Logic, (Oxford, 1962)
p. 25. 26
Politics, VII, 11, 1330a 40. (H. Rackham (Harvard, Loeb,
1932), numbers the chapters differently and makes this VII, x.) 27
Politics, VII. 16, 1335b 13. (Rackham, VII, 14) 28
Politics, VII, 17, 1336a 8 (Rackham, VII.xv.) 29 P 24. 30 J.L. Ackrill,
Aristotle's Categories (Oxford, 1963) p, 71 31 Ibid, p. 78. 32
W. Neale, K. Neale, The Development of Logic, (Oxford, 1962)
p. 31. 33
Posterior Analytics, I. iv-v., 73b 37, 74a 17, 74b 1. 34
Posterior Analytics, II. viii, 93a 14-21. 35 Kant and the
Platypus (1997, English trans. A. McEwen, Harcourt Brace, 2000)
p. 22. L. Wittgenstein says, Philosophy,
as we use the word, is a fight against the fascination which forms of
expression exert upon us. The Blue and Brown Books
(Harper, 1958) p. 27 36 140a 20. 37 The Greek word
επιγελω (eh pee ghe lo) means "sparkle" and "laugh." 38 See. S. Wexler,
Burden of Proof Writ Large, 33 UBC L.R. 75, 80 (1999). 39 Topics,
139b 8-9. 40 Parva Naturalia,
460a 13. 41 Parva Naturalia,
462a. 42
Parva Naturalia, 452b 25. 43 Introduction
to Contemporary Civilization in the West, Vol. 1 (Columbia University
Press, 1960). Translation of Aristotle Politics
Bk III, ch. 4 by J.E. C. Welldon (London, 1883). 44 Rhetoric
2.9.11. 45 Parva Naturalia
442a 20. 46 Politics
1290 b. 47 Politics
III. 16, 1287b 13. |